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The Effects of an Undefined "Ultimate Authority"
Standard for Rule lOb-5 Claims:
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
I. INTRODUCTION

In an episode of NBC's comedy series, The Office, Michael
Scott and Jim Halpert both share the role of co-manager of the Scranton
branch of Dunder Mifflin Paper Company, Inc., a fictional paper sales
The two co-managers try to work together but the
company.'
employees struggle to determine which manager has ultimate authority
over the office.2 The confusion created by the blurred chain of
command leads one employee to quip, "[1]ook, it doesn't take a genius
to know that every organization thrives when it has two leaders. Go
ahead; name a country that doesn't have two presidents. A boat that
sets sail without two captains. Where would Catholicism be, without
the popes[?]" 3 The scenario causes laughter when presented in a
sitcom, but the question of who has "ultimate authority" can have
drastic effects in the real world, including a determination of whether a
suit alleging fraud against a mutual fund advisor will go to trial or be
dismissed.4
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivate Traders,5 the

Supreme Court held that an investment management company that was
"significantly involved in preparing prospectuses" was not liable under
Rule lOb-5 for making an untrue statement of material fact.6 As a result,
the Supreme Court dismissed the suit.7 The Court determined that the
1. See The Office: The Promotion(NBC television broadcast Oct. 1, 2009) (summary
available at http://www.tv.com/shows/the-office/the-promotion-1297084/recap/).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. E.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2305.
7. Id. (reversing the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit dismissing the suit against Janus Capital Management).
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investment management company did not actually "make" the
statements because it did not have "ultimate authority" over the
statements.8 The Court explained that "for purposes of Rule lOb-5, the
maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over
the statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it." 9 This holding "sharply limits private federal securities
fraud suits" brought against individuals and entities that prepare
disclosure documents such as prospectuses on behalf of other fund
companies.' 0 Additionally, the holding has created ambiguity in
determining who actually has "ultimate authority" and therefore is able
to "make" a statement." Since the Supreme Court decision, several
2 and different courts have
lower courts have cited to Janus Capital,1
interpreted the limit on "ultimate authority" in different ways.' 3 While
the Court's decision in Janus Capital may be one of its "most
significant" securities cases in recent years, the holding left many
ambiguities,14 including the all important question of which persons or
entities have "ultimate authority." 5
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, concluding that the
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2302.
10. Client Alert, Gerard G. Pecht et al., Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Supreme Court
Further Curtails Private Securities Fraud Suits Against Outside Advisors (June 13, 2011),
http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction-publications.detail&pub-id=4967&siteid
=494&detail=yes.
11. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc., Sec, Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., No. 2:05-CV02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (refusing to dismiss a claim by
noting the holding in Janus Capital is limited to separate and independent entities and does
not affect the potential liability of corporate officers), with Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust
Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011)
(dismissing a claim while noting that there is nothing in Janus Capital that limits the
holding to separate and independent entities).
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, No. 08 Civ. 4612 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108805
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011); Haw. Ironworkers,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760; In re Merck &
Co., 2011 WL 3444199.
13. Compare In re Merck & Co., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
14. Yin Wilczek, Negative Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes Generate Lawsuits,
ConflictingDecisions, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1999 (Oct. 3, 2011) ("On another
topic, [Jonathan] Youngwood observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has been very active on
the securities front in the last two years. He predicted that of the three securities decisions
issued during the court's previous term ... Janus will be the most significant.").
15. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(setting forth the standard that the maker of the statement is the entity with "ultimate
authority").
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Supreme Court correctly interpreted Rule 1Ob-5 in its decision;
however, the Court left open the question of who has "ultimate
authority" leaving the district courts and circuit courts to determine the
answer. Part II of this Note provides a detailed background of Rule
lOb-5.1 6 This section includes a glimpse into the history of the Rule,
discussing both the statutory authority for the SEC to make such a rule
as well as the limitations imposed on the Rule through various court
decisions. Part III then addresses the Janus Capitalcase, discussing the
procedural history, the Supreme Court's holding, and the dissent.1 7 Part
IV of this Note includes an analysis of the decision in Janus Capitaland
This
evaluates the outstanding question of "ultimate authority.""
section discusses three lower court holdings since Janus Capital and
analyzes the differences in applying the "ultimate authority" test. This
section also discusses both the effects and consequences of these
varying holdings and also analyzes alternative actions that may be
brought against investment advisors. Finally, Part V provides a
summary of the findings and reiterates that the Court was correct in
Janus Capitalbut did not go far enough in defining which persons and
entities have "ultimate authority" to avoid ambiguity and discrepancies
in future cases.' 9
II. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND SEC RULE 1OB-5
The gravamen of the complaint in Janus Capital is the Court's
interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5. 20 This Rule is titled "Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devises" and states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud,

16. See infra PartII.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2301 ("We granted certiorari to address
whether JCM can be held liable in a private action under Rule l0b-5 for false statements
included in Janus Investment Fund's prospectuses.").
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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.21
An analysis of the creation of the Rule as well as its limitations
is imperative in understanding the Court's decision in Janus Capital.
A.

The Creation ofRule 10b-5

Congress granted the SEC rulemaking authority to create Rule
lOb-5 as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22 Although
Congress granted the power to enact rules to prevent manipulative or
deceptive devices, the creation of Rule 1Ob-5 was sparked by one
individual's manipulation.2 3 The SEC was notified of "the president of
some company in Boston who [was] going around buying up the stock
of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he
[had] been telling them that the company [was] doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings [were] going to be quadrupled." 24 As
recounted by Milton Freeman, upon being notified of the manipulation,
"I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where 'in connection
with the purchase or sale' should be . . . ."25 He gave the new rule to the
Commission and there was no debate or comment other than one person

21.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).

22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (2006) ("The Commission, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the other agencies enumerated in section 78c(a)(34) of this
title shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for which they are responsible or for
the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter .... ); id. § 78j(a)-(b) (2006)
("[I]n contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.").
23. Conference on Codification ofthe Federal SecuritiesLaws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922

(1966-1967).
24. Id.
25. Id.

2012]1

409

"ULTIMATE AUTHORITY" IN 1OB-5 CLAIMS

who asked a rhetorical, "[w]ell, we are against fraud, aren't we?" 26 It
was this quick turn of events that created Rule IOb-5.
Although Rule lOb-5 is now the "primary private remedy for
fraud available under the Securities Exchange Act," 28 Freeman
commented that at the time he did not think the creation of the Rule
would be the "biggest thing that had ever happened." 29 This
underestimation of the magnitude of the Rule, along with the swiftness
of the creation of the Rule, may lead some to question exactly how
much time and thought went into the precise language used, and
therefore how much weight the courts should give the language. 30
B.

The Origins of the Language ofRule 10b-5

As noted in Freeman's account, the language used in Rule 1Ob-5
was created through the fusion of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
Section 10(b) of the Act provided much broader language than
is used in Rule 1Ob-5 by making it unlawful:
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered . .

,

any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.32

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 518
(West Publ'g Co., 6th ed. 2009).
29. Conference on Codification,supra note 23, at 922.
30. Conference on Codification,supra note 23, at 922 (discussing the rapid creation of
the rule and the limited debate surrounding the language of the rule). Cf Rulemaking, How
it Works, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rulemaking.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012) ("Rulemaking generally involves several steps that are designed to
give members of the public an opportunity to provide their opinions on whether the agency
should reject, approve, or approve with modifications a rule proposal.").
31. Conference on Codification, supra note 23, at 922.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).

410

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

Section 17(a)
in part, that:

uses more

broad language

[Vol. 16

as well providing,

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale
of any securities . .. directly or indirectly (1) to employ

any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to
obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading; or (3) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.33
Quite possibly the biggest and most relevant difference between
these two statutes and the language of Rule 1Ob-5 is that neither of the
two statutes use the specific language "to make."3 4 The language in the
two sections passed by Congress use phrases such as "to use or
employ" 35 or "to employ" 36 but when the two were merged by the
SEC 37 these more broad phrases dropped out and were replaced with the
word "make." 3 8 Arguably, "to make" narrows the scope of the Rule
from a more expansive 10(b) and 17(a). 39 This may have been a
conscious decision or may have been a seemingly harmless minor
change in language used. 40 However, if a court were to hold that the use
of "make" was a harmless change that did not narrow the scope of the
Rule, the court would need to overcome the canon of construction that a
statute means what it says and says what it means. 41

33. Id. § 77q(a).
34. Compare id § 78j, and id. § 77q, with 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
36. Id. § 77q(a).
37. Conference on Codification,supra note 23, at 922.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
39. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011) (limiting the entities that "make" a statement to those that have "ultimate authority").
40. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); id. § 77q (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
41. Cf Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) ("[Courts] have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.").
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The Rule is Only as Broad as the Statute

Rule lOb-5 is also limited in its use in that it only is as broad as
the statute that gives the SEC the authority to make rules in the area of
fraud and misrepresentation. 42 The Court has been faced with the issue
of an expanding Rule lOb-5 before as in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder4 3
when the Court ruled that negligence was not enough for a Rule lOb-5
claim because it went beyond the scope of the statute.4 In that case, the
SEC argued that the purpose of Section 10(b) was to "protect investors
against false and deceptive practices that might injure them" and that
"the 'effect' upon investors of given conduct is the same regardless of
whether the conduct is negligent or intentional." 45 Refusing to expand
the scope of the statute, the Court did not accept the argument and
reiterated that "[t]o let general words draw nourishment from their
purpose is one thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the
bounds of the normal meaning of words is quite another."4 6 In
analyzing other cases brought under Rule 10b-5, courts must remain
cognizant of this guiding principle and not expand the use of the rule
beyond the statute that it seeks to enforce.
D.

The PrivateRight ofAction

Despite no expressed private right of action, courts have found
that Rule lOb-5 gives rise to an implied private remedy.4 7 Since the
initial ruling providing this private right in 1946, the private remedy has
expanded and is described as a "judicial oak which has grown from
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976) ("The rulemaking power
granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is
not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' Thus, despite the broad view of the Rule
advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under § 10(b).") (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74
(1965)).
43. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44. Id. at 197-99 (holding that allowing a claim of negligence under Section 10(b)
would expand beyond the statute's limitations of "manipulative and deceptive" and "add a
gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted
meaning").
45. Id. at 197-98.
46. Id. (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944)).
47. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l. Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (providing
a private remedy because the violation of the statute implied a remedy).
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While the reading and use of
little more than a legislative acorn.'
Rule 1Ob-5 has expanded over the years, the suits brought under it are
still limited to ones of primary liability. 4 9 As a result, suits brought
against entities that contribute "substantial assistance" to making
statements but do not go as far as actually making the statement can be
brought by the SEC but not by private parties.5 0 This distinction
between primary liability and aiding and abetting liability is one that is
of great importance in determining which individual or entity has
"ultimate authority" as required by the Janus Capital case.5 '
III. AN OVERVIEW OF JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. FIRST DERIVATIVE
TRADERS

A.

FactualBackground Leading Up to the Supreme Court Case

The Janus mutual funds at issue in this case were created by
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG).52 The mutual funds are held in a
business trust with the name Janus Investment Fund (JIF).53 Janus
Capital Management LLC (JCM), a wholly owned subsidiary of JCG,
was the investment adviser and the administrator of the JIF.54 The
Court made note of the fact that the JIF is "a separate legal entity owned
entirely by mutual fund investors," and despite being created by JCG, it
must be treated as a separate entity. 5 In addition to being organized as
separate legal entities, these legal entities followed corporate formalities
and acted as separate business entities.56
48. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (dismissing the
case for failure to state a claim where the plaintiffs had not bought or sold the securities
described in the misleading prospectus).
49. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 165 (1994) (holding that Rule lOb-5's private right of action does not include suits
against aiders and abettors).
50. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011);
see also, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) ("For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under
paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title, any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any
rule or regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.").
51. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 2304 ("Although First Derivatives and its amici persuasively argue that
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The Janus Capital case addressed issues related to language in
the JIF prospectuses.s A prospectus is a disclosure document that must
be issued as required by the Securities Act of 1933 before a legal entity
can offer and sell securities. 8 The prospectuses were issued by JIF for
their mutual funds and sought to provide investors with important
information about the funds so that investors could make informed
decisions. 59 Included in the prospectuses were statements "that the
funds were not suitable for market timing" and it was suggested that
"JCM would implement policies to curb the practice" of marketing
timing.60
investment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds it is undisputed that
the corporate formalities were observed here.") (citation omitted).
57. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 ("There is no allegation that JCM in
fact filed the prospectuses and falsely attributed them to Janus Investment Fund. Nor did
anything on the face of the prospectuses indicate that any statements therein came from
JCM rather than Janus Investment Fund - a legally independent entity with its own board of
trustees.").
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (prohibiting sales unless a registration statement is filed
with the SEC); § 77e(c) (prohibiting offers prior to the filing of registration statements); §
77j (detailing information required in prospectus).
59. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2299 ("As the securities laws require, Janus
Investment Fund issued prospectuses describing the investment strategy and operations of
its mutual funds to investors.").
60. Id. ("The prospectuses for several funds represented that the funds were not
suitable for market timing and can be read to suggest that JCM would implement policies to
curb the practice."). "Market timing, as it occurred here, refers to the practice of rapidly
trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the fund
values its shares. Some funds, including the Janus funds, use stale prices to calculate the
value of the securities held in the fund's portfolio (net asset values (NAVs)), which may not
reflect the fair value of the securities as of the time the NAV is calculated. The use of stale
prices to calculate the NAV makes a fund vulnerable to time zone arbitrage and other
similar strategies; repeated use of such strategies is referred to as 'timing' the fund. Time
zone arbitrage can occur when a fund is invested in foreign securities. As we explained in In
re Mutual Funds Investment Litig.:
[T]ime zone differences allow market timers to purchase shares of [mutual] funds [that
invest in foreign securities] based on events occurring after foreign market closing prices are
established, but before the fund's NAV calculation. Prior to the daily NAV calculation,
which in the United States generally occurs at or near the closing time of the major U.S.
securities markets, the fund price would not take into account any changes that have
affected the value of the foreign security. Therefore, if the foreign security had increased in
value, the NAV for the mutual fund would be artificially low. After purchasing the shares at
the low price, the market timer would redeem the fund's shares the next day when the
fund's share price would reflect the increased prices in foreign markets, for a quick profit at
the expense of the long-term fund shareholders.
529 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Market timing
has the potential to harm other fund investors by diluting the value of shares, increasing
transaction costs, reducing investment opportunities for the fund, and producing negative
tax consequences." Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.), 566
F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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The New York Attorney General filed a complaint in September
2003 against JCG and JCM alleging that JCG "entered into secret
arrangements to permit market timing in several funds run by JCM." 61
This complaint ultimately led to the withdrawal of "significant amounts
of money from the [JIF] mutual funds," which in turn decreased the
value of both the funds and JCG's stock price.62 Since JCG received a
significant percentage of its income from the JCM's management fees,
and since JCM was compensated based on the total value of the JIF, a
decrease in the assets under management in the JIF had a ripple effect,
ultimately causing the stock price of JCG to decline.63
Subsequent to the decrease in the JCG stock price and after the
New York Attorney General's complaint, First Derivative, representing
a class of plaintiffs who owned JCG stock,64 filed a suit alleging that
JCM and JCG violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule lOb-5. 65 While First Derivative was not a -party at the
district court, they joined the suit and represented the class of
plaintiffs.66 The claims stated that JCG and JCM "caused mutual fund
prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them
available to the investing public, which created the misleading
impression that [JCG and JCM] would implement measures to curb
market timing in the Janus [mutual funds]."67

The specific issue that the Court addressed in this case was
whether JCM, the investment adviser to the JIF, could be held liable in a
private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in the
61. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
62. Id.
63. Id. ("[B]ecause Janus Investment Fund compensated JCM based on the total value
of the funds and JCM's management fees comprised a significant percentage of JCG's
income, Janus Investment Fund's loss of value affected JCG's value as well.").
64. The facts of this case are relatively unique as the suit is being brought by JCG
stock holders, against JCM based on JCM's role as an investment advisor for JIF mutual
funds.
65. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2300-01.
66. Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 566 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131
S. Ct. 2296 (2011) ("First Derivative, individually and on behalf of certain shareholders of
Janus Capital Group Inc. (JCG), filed the operative complaint against JCG and its whollyowned subsidiary Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM). JCM is the investment advisor to
the Janus mutual funds.").
67. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2300 (citation omitted). First Derivative
brought other claims including holding JCM liable as a "controlling person" under 15
U.S.C.A. § 78t(a); however, these claims were beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's
certiorariand therefore beyond the scope of this Note. Id. at 2301.

2012]

"ULTIMATE AUTHORITY" IN 1OB-5 CLAIMS

415

prospectus for the JIF.68 Prior to the Supreme Court addressing that
question, the case worked its way through the lower courts.
B.

PriorHistory: DistrictCourt and CircuitCourt Decisions

The initial trial was held in the United States District Court for
Maryland. 69 The District Court addressed the plaintiffs' 10(b) claims
against JCM by first noting that the alleged fraud must have "occurred
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." 70 The court cited
to a previous case where it ruled that an investment adviser owed no
duty to the parent company's shareholders because the plaintiffs had not
purchased or sold the securities. 71 Following their previous holding, the
court dismissed the action against JCM because the plaintiffs held JCG
stock, and therefore JCM did not owe them a duty. 72 In dismissing the
action, the District Court did not need to decide whether JCM made the
alleged misstatements upon which the plaintiffs relied.73
The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit where the District
Court's holding was ultimately reversed.74 The Circuit Court began by
outlining the fraud-on-the-market doctrine on which the plaintiffs
This doctrine required the plaintiff to prove "(1) that the
relied.
defendant made the public misrepresentations; (2) that the
misrepresentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an
efficient market; and (4) that the plaintiff purchased the shares after the
The
misrepresentations but before the truth was revealed."76
defendants, JCG and JCM only disputed the first element: that they did
not make the public misrepresentations. 77 In doing so, they argued that
68. Id. at 2299.
69. Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. (In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.), 487 F. Supp. 2d
618 (D. Md. 2007), rev'd & remanded, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011).
70. Id. at 622 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005)).
71. Id. at 622-23.
72. Id. at 623.
73. Id. at 622, n.5 ("Because I find that my ruling in Fischbein is dispositive of
plaintiffs claim against JCM, I need not decide whether JCM made the alleged
misstatements upon which plaintiffs rely.").
74. Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.), 566 F.3d 111,
115 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
75. Id. at 120.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 120-21.
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they did not make the statements in the prospectus and that the
statements were not publicly attributable to them.
The Circuit Court determined that the complaint sufficiently
alleged that both JCG and JCM had made the misleading statements
contained in the prospectuses to meet the pleading standards. 79 After
reaching that conclusion, the court ruled differently on the two
defendants and held that investors would infer JCM either prepared or
approved the languages0 but that the same was not true for JCG.8 '
Based on these findings, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
sufficiently "pled a viable claim of primary §10(b) liability against
JCM" and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.82 The
78. Id. at 121 ("JCG and JCM press two distinct aspects of this pleading requirement,
arguing that plaintiffs do not adequately allege either (1) that defendants made the
statements in the prospectuses or (2) that the statements contained in the prospectuses were
sufficiently publicly attributable to defendants to hold them responsible.").
79. Id. ("In this case, although the individual fund prospectuses are unattributed on
their face, the clear essence of plaintiffs' complaint is that JCG and JCM helped draft the
misleading prospectuses. Specifically, the complaint alleges that defendants 'wrote and
represented [their] policy against market timers,' and 'publicly issued false and misleading
statements.' The complaint also alleges that defendants 'represented that [their] mutual
funds were designed to be long-term investments for 'buy and hold' investors and were
therefore favored investment vehicles for retirement plans.' According to the complaint,
defendants made these representations by 'caus[ing] mutual fund prospectuses to be issued
for Janus mutual funds and ma[king] them available to the investing public,' through filings
with the SEC and dissemination on a joint Janus website. These statements, taken together,
allege that JCG and JCM, by participating in the writing and dissemination of the
prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents .... And the
allegations are sufficiently clear as to the identity of the entities making the misleading
statements to meet the pleading standards of Rule 9(b).") (citations omitted).
80. Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 566 F.3d at 127 ("We conclude, at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage, that given the publicly disclosed responsibilities of JCM, interested investors
would infer that JCM played a role in preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund
prospectuses, particularly the content pertaining to the funds' policies affecting the purchase
or sale of shares. It was publicly known that JCM furnished advice and recommendations
conceming the Janus funds' investment decisions and even made NAV determinations,
which in part enabled market timing. In light of the publicly available material, interested
investors would have inferred that if JCM had not itself written the policies in the Janus
fund prospectuses regarding market timing, it must at least have approved these statements.
This circumstance is sufficient to support the adequacy of plaintiffs pleading of fraud-onthe-market reliance as to JCM.").
81. Id. at 128 ("We cannot say, however, that it would be apparent to the investing
public that the investment advisor's parent company, which sponsors a family of funds,
participates in the drafting or approving of prospectuses issued by the individual funds.
Although JCG, like JCM, played a role in the dissemination of the fund prospectuses on
the Janus website, this fact, taken by itself, is insufficient in this case for us to infer that
interested investors would believe JCG had prepared or approved the Janus fund
prospectuses.").
82. Id. at 131.
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defendants petitioned for certiorari,and the Supreme Court granted it to
determine if JCM could be liable "in a private action under Rule lOb-5
for false statements included in [JIF] prospectuses."a
C.

The Supreme Court Decides Janus CapitalGroup Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders

The Supreme Court began their review by recounting the facts
of the case and providing a brief history of Rule 1Ob-5, which provides
in part that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly. . . [t]o make any untrue statement of material fact. . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security". 84 The Court
directed their focus to the crucial ambiguity at issue: the meaning of the
word "make" as used in Rule l0b-5.8 ' The majority held that "[w]hen
'make' is paired with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the
resulting phrase is 'approximately equivalent in sense' to that verb." 86
Thus, the phrase "to make a statement" has the same meaning as "to
state."87 The court then declared what is likely to be one of the most
quoted passages of the case:
[fjor purposes of Rule 1Ob-5, the maker of a statement is
the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it. Without control, a person or entity can
merely suggest what to say, not 'make' a statement in its
own right."
This is the statement that draws the line in the sand; courts
hearing future cases will need to determine if the entity had the
"ultimate authority" as described above, before holding the defendant
liable for a cause of action under Rule lOb-5. 89 In Janus Capital, the
83. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011).
84. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
85. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (discussing the meaning of the
word "make" as used in different contexts).
86. Id. at 2302.
87. Id. (providing additional examples such as "to make a proclamation" is the same as
"to proclaim" and "to make a promise" is the same as "to promise").
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Court held that it was the JIF that "made" the statements as they were
the entity that had the duty to file the prospectus with the SEC and it
was the JIF that filed the funds' prospectuses with the SEC. 90
In reaching this holding, the Court addressed numerous theories
put forth by the plaintiffs. 9 1 First Derivative suggested that JCM
"made" the statements within the meaning of Rule 1Ob-5 "because JCM
was significantly involved in preparing the prospectuses." 92 The Court
refuted this argument by likening the analysis of "ultimate authority" to
that of a speechwriter and a speaker. 93 In this case, JCM, acting like a
speechwriter, may have assisted in the language used in the
prospectuses, but "JCM itself did not 'make' those statements for
purposes of Rule lOb-5."9 4 The Court also noted that JCM hosted the
JIF prospectuses on its website, but that "[m]erely hosting a document
on a Web site does not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the
document as its own statement or exercises control over its content." 95
Additionally the Court noted that nothing in the prospectus "indicate[d]
that any statements therein came from JCM rather than rather than [the
JIF]."96

The Court also had the occasion to address the issue of primary
and secondary liability as it relates to Rule 1Ob-5. 97 The Court has
consistently held that Rule 1Ob-5's private right of action is limited to
primary liability and does not include suits against aiders or abettors.98
In maintaining this distinction, the Court in Janus Capital stated that
"[i]f persons or entities without control over the content of a statement
could be considered primary violators who 'made' the statement, then

90. Id. at 2304.
91. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.1 1 (addressing theories including that
the word "indirectly" expands the meaning of "make" and that both JCM and Janus
Investment Fund might have "made" the statement).
92. Id. at 2305.
93. Id. at 2302 ("This rule might best be exemplified by the relationship between a
speechwriter and a speaker. Even when the speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is
entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes
credit - or blame - for what is ultimately said.").
94. Id at 2305.
95. Id at 2305 n.12 (citing cf United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir.
2009)).
96. Id. at 2305.
97. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
98. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 511
U.S. 164, 180 (1994).
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aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent." 99 After reviewing the
relevant laws and dismissing the plaintiffs arguments, the Court held
that only the person or entity with "ultimate authority" could be liable
under Rule lOb-5 and in this case, JCM did not have the requisite
ultimate authority. 1o
D.

The Dissent
Considering that Janus Capitalwas a 5-4 decision,o it is worth

discussing the opinion of the dissent as well. The dissent's main
argument was that the majority misinterpreted the word "make." 1 02
Rather than be limited to the person with "ultimate authority," the
dissent argued that the language and case law shows that many other
individuals and entities are able to "make" a statement contained in a
prospectus. 103
The dissent claimed that it is possible for several different
people to "make" a statement that each person has a hand in creating,
and that nothing in the English language prevents this conclusion.1 04 In
contrast to the majority's analogy to a speechwriter and the person who
ultimately makes the speech, the dissent argued that corporate officials
always make statements that the board of directors actually has control
over, and that cabinet officials, such as the Secretary of State, make
statements that the President actually has ultimate authority over.105
Additionally, the dissent argued that there is no support for the
majority's definition of "make" in any case law. 06 The majority cited
to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,

N.A., 107 but the dissent claims that the majority misinterpreted the case
and that while Central Bank discusses secondary liability, "the present
99. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
100. Id. at 2305.
101. Id. (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2306.
103. Id. ("To the contrary, both language and case law indicate that, depending on the
circumstances a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or
others, separately or together, might 'make' statements contained in a firm's prospectus even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility.").
104. Id at 2307.
105. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id
107. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
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case is actually about primary liability - about individuals who
allegedly themselves 'make' materially false statements, not about those
who help others do so."108 The dissent also argued that Stoneridge
Investment Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.109 did not provide

any authority in support of the majority because the issue in that case
was whether any deceptive statement had the proximate relation to the
investors' harm." 0 After discussing the specific language of the Rule
and the distinguishing the case at hand from the Court's earlier cases,
the dissent concluded that "as long as some managers, sometimes, can
be held to have 'ma[d]e' a materially false statement" then the facts
alleged by the plaintiffs should be sufficient and the claim should not
have been dismissed."'
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF JANUS CAPITAL INC. V. FIRST DERIVATIVE
TRADERS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE CASE

A.

Discussion of the Majority's Holding

In Janus Capitalthe majority held that JCM could not be liable
under Rule 1Ob-5 because it was not the "entity with ultimate authority
over the statement" and therefore was not the "maker of [the]
statement."ll 2 In doing so, the majority upheld two principles that are
explicitly part of securities law: the difference between primary and
secondary liabilityll 3 and the recognition that investment advisers are
separate legal entities and need to be treated as such provided they
follow corporate formalities."14
The majority's holding in Janus Capital is consistent with
Central Bank which held that there is no private right of action against
aiders and abettors under lOb-5." 5 The majority came to the logical

108. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
110. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2308-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Ill. Id. at 2312 (alteration in original).
112. Id. at 2302 (majority opinion).
113. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164; Stoneridge Inv. Partners,LLC, 552 U.S.
148.
114. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, SEC Release No. 337932, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3735 (Jan. 16, 2001).
115. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (citing Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S.
at 180).
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conclusion that its definition of "made" was necessary to maintain some
distinction between primary liability and secondary liability and that
"[i]f persons or entities without control over the content of a statement
could be considered primary violators who 'made' the statement, then
This decision
aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent."'
ensures that the distinction between primary and secondary continues to
be well defined and that primary liability does not expand past its limits
to affect secondary actors. 17
While maintaining the clean line between primary and
secondary liability, the majority also correctly refused to be influenced
by the plaintiff First Derivative's argument that the "well-recognized
and uniquely close relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser"
causes the advisor to be understood as the "maker."' 18 The majority
observed that JCM and the JIF are separate legal entities that followed
corporate formalities and are therefore distinguishable from their mutual
fund clients.1 9 This decision is seemingly backed by the SEC which
recognized that "the investment adviser is separate and distinct from the
fund it advises, with primary responsibility and loyalty to its own
shareholders." 2 0 If there is a unique relationship in the context of
mutual funds and their advisers, the issues created by that relationship
can be - and to some extent have been - addressed by the SEC or

Congress.121 While there is ample room for discussions around the
unique structure of mutual funds, the Court correctly refused to address
it in this case.' 2 2
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2302 n.6 ("We draw a clean line between the two - the maker is the person or
entity with ultimate authority over a statement and others are not. In contrast, the dissent's
only limit on primary liability is not much of a limit at all. It would allow for primary
liability whenever '[t]he specific relationships alleged ... warranted [that] conclusion' whatever that may mean.").
118. Id. at 2304 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 21, Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525)).
119. Id at 2304.
120. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, SEC Release No. 337932, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3735 (Jan. 16, 2001).
121. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2304 ("Congress also has established
liability in § 20(a) for '[elvery person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable'
for violations of the securities laws. First Derivative's theory of liability based on a
relationship of influence resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control. To adopt
First Derivative's theory would read into Rule lOb-5 a theory of liability similar to - but
broader in application than . . . - what Congress has already created elsewhere. We decline
to do so.") (citation omitted).
122. See also Norman S. Poser, The Supreme Court's Janus Capital Case, 44 THE REV.
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The Court drew a clear line between primary and secondary
liability and between separate legal entities, however, the Court did not
go far enough in defining "ultimate authority." The Court noted that the
person or entity with "ultimate authority" is the person or entity that has
control over the statement's "content and whether and how to
communicate it." 23 While the holding provided some guidance over
who has "ultimate authority," there remains a lot of ambiguity, and
lower courts have differed in their application of the "ultimate
authority" standard, especially as it relates to corporate insiders.124
Applications of the Holding to CorporateInsiders

B.

Since the decision, courts have differed in their application of
the Supreme Court's holding in Janus Capital; specifically, the issue of
who has "ultimate authority." Within three months of the case, two
courts were faced with the question of whether "the Supreme Court's
'ultimate authority' requirement for primary liability also applied to
corporate insiders."l 2 5
The first case to apply Janus Capital to corporate insiders was
In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation.126

This case involved an executive vice president's statements that were
made public and attributed to him in the company's public filings.1 27
The executive's claim, relying on Janus Capital,was that "he cannot be
liable for [the statement] because the Complaint does not allege that he
has 'ultimate authority over the statement."'l28 However, the court
found that this claim "takes the Janus holding out of context" 29 in that
OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 205 (2011) (discussing the contrary point of view that the

"the Court was formalistic and out of touch with reality" and that "[t]he Court failed to give
proper consideration to the unique structure of the mutual fund industry or to the likely
consequences of its decision").
123. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
124. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc., Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 2:05-CV02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011), with Haw. Ironworkers
Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 1, 2011).
125. Ultimate Authority, THE 1013-5 DAILY (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.thel0b5daily.com/archives/001 149.html.
126. In re Merck& Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199.
127.

Id.

128. Id. at *24.
129. Id. at *25 ("[The executive's] role in the statements attributed to him is in no way
analogous to Janus Capital Management's relationship to the statements issued by Janus
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"[h]e made statements pursuant to his responsibility and authority to act
as an agent of Merck, not as in Janus, on behalf of some separate and
independent entity."13

The court noted "the well-established rule that

'a corporation can act only through its employees and agents"' and
concluded that "[t]aken to its logical conclusion, [the executive's]
position would absolve corporate officers of primary liability for all
Rule lOb-5 claims, because ultimately, the statements are within the
control of the corporation which employs them."l 3 ' This is a logical
conclusion, but it is only one interpretation of the holding in Janus.132
Less than a month after In re Merck & Co. the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio found in Hawaii Ironworkers
Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole'33 that "nothing in the Court's decision in

Janus limits the key holding ... to legally separate entities." 34 In this
case, the complaint alleged that the defendants, who were officers at the
company, "worked together to falsify financial information about the
The
financial circumstances" of a specific business unit.' 35
misinformation was then used by officials at the company who gave
"overly optimistic public statements." 3 6
The analysis of whether the officers in Hawaii Ironworkers had
ultimate authority entailed examining "the degree of separation between
entities," which will "inform the analysis of where ultimate authority
lies." 37 In Hawaii Ironworkers, the fact specific inquiry determined
that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) of the company had put pressure on the defendants to provide
forecasts that met certain benchmarks and even rejected previously
submitted forecasts that did not meet the benchmark.138 As a result,
Investment Fund.").
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers
Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 1, 2011).
133. Haw. Ironworkers,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
134. Id. at *9.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *9.
138. Id at *13-15 ("Plaintiff adds, 'Burns and Richter knew that the edict was
unobtainable' and that by requiring this arbitrary numbers defendants 'would have to
manipulate the underlying data to generate reported profits.' 'This pressure was so severe
that actual forecasts provided by plant personnel were not accepted by [the company's]
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"[t]he defendants sent the results that they were commanded to send."l 39
The court determined that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
because "the defendants did not have ultimate authority over the content
of the statement" despite being corporate insiders.140
In addition to these two cases discussing corporate insiders, the
District Court for Nebraska analyzed the impact of Janus Capital in
suits brought by the SEC.141 In SEC v. Das,142 the defendants attempted
to argue that they were not the "makers" of statements despite being
CFOs of the company that filed the relevant forms.143 The court held
that they were in fact the makers of such statements, citing Janus
Capital,and stating that the defendants were "the persons with ultimate
authority and control over the content of the statements and whether and
how they were communicated."l44 While the Court in Janus Capital
sought to limit the private right of action under Rule lOb-5 by defining
the word "maker" as the person with "ultimate authority," 45 the District
Court for Nebraska interpreted Janus Capital as also narrowing the
SEC's ability to bring a lOb-5 action against people without the
requisite ultimate authority.14 6 Under the District Court for Nebraska's
application of Janus Capital any investment advisor, lawyer, or other
party who assists in the creation of a statement but does not "make" the
statement, is exempt from 1Ob-5 liability regardless of whether the suit
is a private action or brought by the SEC - unless it is brought as an
aiding or abetting suit which is a different form of liability.147

finance department personnel if they did not meet the pre-established benchmark.' Thus 'the
increased forecasts were not based on the plant's actual performance, but instead were
determined from above before a plant's budget would be accepted and approved by finance
department personnel."') (citations omitted).
139. Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 at *15.
140. Id at**15-16.
141. See, e.g., SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CVIO2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106982 (D. Neb.
Sept. 20, 2011) (discussing a suit brought by the SEC against two former CFOs of a
company).
142. Id.
143. Id at * 17-18.
144. Id at *18.
145. See Janus CapitalGrp., Inc. 131 S. Ct. at 2305.
146. SEC v. Das, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106982, at *16-19 (applying the Janus Capital
definition of "make" to a suit brought by the SEC against two company executives).
147. Cf id (discussing a suit brought by the SEC against two former CFOs of a
company).
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The issue of who has "ultimate authority" is one that the court
left open in Janus Capital.148 The Court provided little guidance on the
use of Janus Capital beyond the facts presented of a suit against a
separate legal entity that acted as an advisor and left it to the lower
courts to decide how to interpret the decision. 14 9 Applying Janus
Capitalto various corporate insiders continues to be "an evolving area
of law" 50 and will likely involve a "very facts-and-circumstances"
analysis. 1 Courts will likely continue to differ on their application of
the holding until the Supreme Court clarifies its holding, or until the
SEC, under its broad rulemaking authority, implements a new rule that
makes Janus Capital moot1 52 or explicates the Janus Capital holding.
However, even if either of these solutions occurs, there is no guarantee
the Supreme Court will answer every outstanding question, and if the
SEC decides to change the rule, it will still be subject to judicial review
to make sure it is operating within the confines of the statutory
language. 153

148. See generally Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296 (limiting the entities that
can "make" a statement to those with "ultimate authority" but not providing any guidance
on what individuals or entities do have "ultimate authority").
149. See id.
150. After Janus, PlaintiffBar'sFocus Will Shift to Other Liability Provisions,Lawyers
Say, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1946, (Sept. 26, 2011) ("The panelist also agreed that
the application of Janus down the executive line - for example, the company controller or
individuals who help in the preparing of corporate statements - is an evolving area of law.")
[hereinafter After Janus].
15 1. Id. ("' [D]own the foodchain, it becomes a very facts-and-circumstances'
determination.").
152. See Satellite Broad. & Commc'ns Ass'n of Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11th
Cir. 1994) (discussing an agency's ability to adopt regulations that conflict with a court
opinion by stating that "[a]lthough such an interpretation is not 'the only one it permissibly
could have adopted ... or even the reading the court would have [and indeed has]
reached .. . in a judicial proceeding,' neither can it be said that the interpretation contradicts
Congress's 'clear meaning."') (citation omitted).
153. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) ("The rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal
statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry
into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' Thus, despite the broad view of
the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power
granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)." (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381
U.S. 68, 74 (1965))).
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Consequences of the Holding and Effect on FutureRule 1Ob-5
Cases

The paradox of creating a "bright line" 54 rule that nevertheless
has resulted in different applications in recent cases 5s indicates that the
issue of Rule lOb-5 liability is likely to continue taking shape for years
to come. The most obvious effect of these cases is that there remains
uncertainty in who can be held liable under Rule lOb-5.' 5 6 While the
Court was clear that separate legal entities do not have "ultimate
authority" over statements in the prospectuses of the funds that they
advise, the Court did not provide clarity surrounding whether the
"ultimate authority" standard is limited within the legal entity that
issues the fund and files the prospectus.' 57
The initial effect is a "major victory for outside advisors" in that
there is now precedent and authority granting them de facto immunity
from lOb-5 suits.' 58 However, as seen in the cases discussed above,
there is not clear precedent for who can be liable within the organization
that issues the mutual fund and files the prospectus.159 In a large
organization, the "ultimate authority" over language may be diffused
and seemingly shared between many parties. In such a situation, the
court will find it difficult to determine which party actually has
"ultimate authority" without extensive discovery and a trial.160
154. Client Alert, Gregory E. Xethalis et al., Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, United
States: Supreme Court Limits Liability of Mutual Fund Advisor for Fund Prospectus
Misstatements (July 21, 2011), http://www.kattenlaw.com/supreme-court-limits-privatelawsuit-primary-liability-of-mutual-fund-advisor-for-fund-prospectus-misstatements/ ("This
is a bright line test that should limit mutual fund advisor liability in Rule lob-5 private
actions.").
155. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 2:05-CV02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011), with Haw. Ironworkers
Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 1, 2011).
156. CompareIn re Merck & Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
157. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 (2011).
158. Pecht, supra note 10.
159. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers,2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
160. In Janus, the court held that Janus Investment Fund had ultimate authority because
they filed the prospectus, but in Hawaii Ironworkers, the court was forced to look at the
internal operations of the company to determine which individuals had ultimate authority.
A complex fact pattern where separate people are creating, editing, and reviewing the
language, and where an officer is not specifically creating the language but providing
guidance may create trouble for determining who should actually be held liable if some
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One consequence of Janus Capitalmay include additional rulemaking by the SEC to address any concerns it has with the Court's
decision. The SEC has broad rule-making authority under Section 10(b),
and can create rules related to enforcing the section so long as the rules
don't exceed the scope of the statute.1 ' As noted above, the SEC seems
to have intentionally narrowed the scope of Rule lOb-5 by using the
word "make" rather than more broad words like "employ,"162 but at the
same time the history of Rule lOb-5 may bring about questions as to
how much time and debate were spent creating the wording of the rule
and therefore question how much weight courts should give the word
"make" in their rulings.163
If the SEC is in disagreement with the Court's ruling, it can
propose a new rule or amend the existing one.164 The SEC could add
the word "create" to Rule lOb-5.165 This would seemingly override
Janus Capital, in that both the majority and dissent seem to agree that
JCM created the language, despite not making any statements.' 6 This
solution may just be kicking the can down the road in that courts would
then need to define and limit "create" without stepping into the
boundaries of the aiding and abetting laws. As the courts have
attempted to limit the private right of action, and since the private right
of action is not even stated in Rule lOb-5, it may be unlikely that the
SEC will seek a rule change to expand a private right of action to any
and all parties involved in the creation of language.' 6 7
An alternative approach to determine who has ultimate authority
individuals are exempt such as in HawaiiIronworkers. See Janus Capital Grp. Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2296; Haw. Ironworkers,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
161. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976) (holding that
allowing a claim of negligence under Section 10(b) would expand beyond the statutes
limitations of "manipulative and deceptive" and "add a gloss to the operative language of
the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning").
162. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006), and id. § 77q (2006), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2011).
163. Conference on Codification, supra note 23, at 922 (noting that the only question
asked about the rule was a rhetorical "well, we are against fraud, aren't we?").
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (2006).
165. The new rule would read in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly,... to make or createany untrue statement of material fact."
166. See Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296.
167. The SEC has not changed the language of the rule in response to other securities
law cases that limit the private right of action. Cf Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that Rule 10b-5's private
right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors).
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may be one put forth by Columbia Law School Professor Jack Coffee 68
"in which the investment advisor is required to join the fund on its
filings, so that the advisor becomes a 'maker' of the funds
statements."l 69 If the SEC required this joint filing, Rule lOb-5 and
Janus Capital could remain good law, and yet JCM or another fund
advisor could be found liable for "making" a statement.170 The issue
here is that there would still be room for debate over who had "ultimate
authority" over the prospectus.' 7 ' While in theory it sounds practical for
both of these entities to place their names on the filing, courts, by
analyzing different fact patterns, would still be able to determine that
only one of the parties had "ultimate authority."l 72 To some degree, it is
almost contradictory to say that two entities can both have "ultimate
authority." 7 3
If the SEC does not take action, and lower courts continue to
differ on their understanding of Janus, the Supreme Court will be faced
with the decision of granting certiorari or allowing different
jurisdictions to have different approaches. Two district courts in
different circuits reached different conclusions about the breadth of
"ultimate authority" and created a split in authority.1 74 This split could
remain even as cases are appealed to the circuit courts because each
circuit could reach a different conclusion. Such a split in authority
would result in issues such as forum shopping where plaintiffs would
seek to bring suits in courts with a broader understanding of "ultimate
authority" in hopes that Rule 1Ob-5 would apply to all of the defendants.
168.

Adolf

A.

Berle

Professor

of

Law,

COLUMBIA

LAW

SCHOOL,

http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/JohnCoffee%20Jr.
169. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the
Supreme Court can "Make" a Tree, THE HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE
AND
FIN.
REGULATION
(June
29,
2011,
9:27
AM),

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-group-v-first-derivativetraders-only-the-supreme-court-can-%E2%80%9Cmake%E2%80%9D-a-tree/.
170. Applying the holding in Janus Capital, the court may rule that an investment
adviser who filed the prospectus with the SEC did have "ultimate authority" and therefore
could be liable for "making" the statements.
171. Cf Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296.
172. Compare In re Merck & Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760 (demonstrating different courts finding different people liable
based on a specific factual circumstance).
173. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (holding that the "maker of a statement
is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it" (emphasis added)).
174. Compare In re Merck & Co., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
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Defendants, on the other hand, would then likely attempt procedures to
claim a lack of personal jurisdiction'7 5 or seek to transferl 76 the case to a
court with a more narrow application of "ultimate authority."' 77
If a split remains, eventually the Supreme Court will likely grant
certiorarito a similar case in order to prevent the issues that come with
different jurisdictions having different approaches.' 7 ' The Court will
need to provide clarity and consistency surrounding who can "make" a
statement and who has "ultimate authority." Ideally, the next case the
Court rules on regarding this topic will have a more straightforward fact
pattern where shareholders of a mutual fund are bringing suit against the
mutual fund company, the outside advisor, or both.179
D.

Alternative Actions Against Investment Advisers

In general, the holding was seen as very favorable to investment
advisers' 80 in that it continues the courts' ongoing efforts to limit the

175. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (outlining the
requirement for personal jurisdiction and noting that "due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice').
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.").
177. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (discussing personal
jurisdiction, removal, transfer, forum non conveniens, and choice of law).
178. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) ("A principal purpose for
which we use our certiorari jurisdiction . . . is to resolve conflicts among the United States
courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law.");
see also SUP. CT. R. 10.1 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the
Court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the court considers: (1) a United
States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same important matter. . . .").
179. Gordon, supra note 169 (noting that "the actual litigation [in Janus Capital] is not a
particularly appealing case for liability. The plaintiff was not a shareholder of the fund
claiming damage from the fraud, but rather a shareholder in the investment advisor,
asserting that as the fraud was uncovered, investors in the fund redeemed their shares, the
pool of managed assets shrank, advisory fees declined, and thus the stock price of the
investment advisor fell. The defendant had been given no opportunity to demonstrate other
factors at work in the stock price. A Supreme Court concerned about the potential reach of
an implied right of action could have disposed of the case on loss causation grounds long
established in the Court's prior cases without creating the collateral damage entailed by
Janus Capital Group v. FirstDerivative Traders").
180. Pecht, supra note 10.
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private right of action under Rule lOb-5.' 8 ' The decision created a
"bright line general principal" that there is no private action available
under Rule 1Ob-5 to sue an entity that creates information or language
that is then put into a statement made by a party with ultimate control.182
The holding may have other benefits to investment advisers including
deterring strike suits where plaintiffs are seeking settlements by
leveraging the complexities and expense of litigation. 183
Although outside advisors seem to benefit from this decision, it
is important to note that there are other available remedies that both the
SEC and private parties can bring against investment advisors. 18 4 While
the SEC has wider authority to bring suits under Rule lOb-5 than
individuals in private actions, the Court did not provide one definition
of the word "make" for private actions, and a separate definition for
SEC actions.' 85 This results not only in investment advisers being
sheltered from private action 1Ob-5 suits, but also from suits brought by
the SEC.1 86 The most straightforward alternative then, is for the SEC to
bring a suit under Rule 1Ob-5 either directly against the mutual fund or
against an adviser through their authority to sue aiders and abettors.187

18 1. Id.
182. Xethalis, supra note 154.
183. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)
(noting that courts have been hesitant to expand the scope of 1Ob-5 in part because the rule
"presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general." These suits often have "a settlement value to the plaintiff
out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial" and therefore expanding the scope of
Rule 1Ob-5 would open the door for more people to bring suit, which has many
consequences. To the extent that the courts limit the scope of Rule 1Ob-5, they will continue
to limit the possibility of these "blackmail" or "strike" suits).
184. Xethalis, supra note 154 (mentioning other forms of liability including that "fund
shareholders may be able to seek redress against the advisor as the 'controlling person' of
the fund under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act").
185. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2299 (defining the word "make" without
providing an exception to the definition for SEC suits).
186. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, No. 08 Civ. 4612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108805
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011) (granting defendant's summary judgment on Rule lob-5 claims
brought by the SEC).
187. Xethalis, supra note 154 (outlining different causes of action).
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One issue with limiting the liability of investment advisors to
suits brought by the SEC is that it takes the prerogative to bring a suit
out of the shareholders hands and limits it to the SEC. 8 8 In one amicus
brief, attorneys pointed out that:
[F]ederal and state governments are too overwhelmed
and cash-strapped to effectively enforce laws;
governments are generally strangers to the transactions
that give rise to allegations of fraud; private actions have
a broader reach, as the government is limited in its
oversight - particularly so in the case of mutual funds;
and, private enforcement actions are the only way to
adequately compensate victims since government
agencies can impose only limited fines.' 89
The brief also argued that the ability to bring a private action
serves as a deterrent to the financial industry and reminds the
investment managers and advisers of their legal duties and
responsibilities.'" It is also important that investors remain confident in
the markets, and knowing they have the ability to hold the industry
These
professionals accountable increases their confidence.' 91
conflicting arguments represent the intricate legal and policy
implications based on how Rule 1Ob-5 is interpreted by courts and
enforced by both private and government action.192
In Janus Capital, the Court limited the implied private right of
action under Rule lOb-5, but courts have been less hostile to other
statutory provisions.1 93 Shareholders have another remedy at their
188. Jay Sushelsky, U.S. Supreme Court Declines to Hold Companies Accountable for
Facilitating Fraudulent Statements, AARP FOUND. LITIG. (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.aarp.org/money/investing/info-09-201 1/janus-capital-group-v-first-derivativetraders.html.
189. Sushelsky, supra note 188.
190. Id. ("[P]rivate actions send a strong message to financial industry professionals as
to their duties of transparency and responsibility, a message that is also important for
investors to hear in order to have confidence in the markets.").
191. Id. ("[Pjrivate actions send a strong message to financial industry professionals as
to their duties of transparency and responsibility, a message that is also important for
investors to hear in order to have confidence in the markets.").
192. Xethalis, supra note 154 (discussing the implications of the Janus Capital
decision).
193. After Janus, supra 150 ("[T]he high court made it clear in Janus that the 'implied'
private right of action under Rule lOb-5 must be construed narrowly. However, the court has

432

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 16

disposal: a suit under Section 20(a) or 20(b) of the Exchange Act.194 A
suit under section 20(a) or 20(b) of the Exchange Act would allow the
shareholders to go after an advisor acting as a "controlling person" of
the fund.195 While this method of bringing suit may be viable,
commentators have also suggested it will open "the way to extensive
litigation over the scope of 'control person' liability."l 96 Either way,
securities attorneys seem to be in agreement that it is time to "dust off
Sections 20(a) and 20(b)."l 97
Additionally, some courts have declined to dismiss post-Janus
CapitalRule 1Ob-5 claims because there is more to Rule 1Ob-5 than just
"to make" a statement. 198 Even in light of Janus Capital these courts
have noted that Rule lOb-5 "also prohibits employing 'any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud' or engaging in 'any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person' in connection with a securities sale." 99 These
holdings may lessen the effect of Janus Capital by focusing on other
language of Rule lOb-5, however, a detailed discussion on the language
of the Rule other than the "to make" addressed in Janus Capital is
beyond the scope of this Note.
V. CONCLUSION
In Janus Capital Group v. FirstDerivative Tradersthe Supreme

Court "sharply limit[ed] private federal securities fraud suits against
been 'less unfriendly or antagonistic' to private actions that have a clear statutory
basis....").
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006) ("Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any
person liable under any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with an to the same extent as such controlled person to
any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action."); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to
do under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means
of any other person.").
195. Xethalis, supranote 154 (outlining different causes of action).
196. Gordon, supra note 169.
197. After Janus, supra note 150 ("I would advise you to dust off Sections 20(a) and
20(b). That is where the focus will shift.") (quoting Jonathan Cuneo, founding partner of
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP).
198. U.S. SEC v. Landberg, No. 11 Civ. 0404, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127827, at *ll12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011).
199. Id. at *12 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011)).
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person and entities who prepare disclosure on behalf of other
companies."200 The court interpreted the language of Rule 1Ob-5 to
apply only to those with "ultimate authority" over the statement.201
While this 5-4 decision has been somewhat controversial, the Court
interpreted the language of Rule 10b-5 to provide a more narrow right
of action than rule 10(b) by replacing the "to employ" language with "to
make." 202
Lower courts have also differed in their application of this
holding to other cases, especially those involving corporate insiders,203
and they have applied the Janus definition of "make" to SEC suits as
well.204 Based on the controversy of the holding and the lack of clarity
in its application, there is likely to be more discussion and potential
changes in the future. The SEC may act by changing the language of
Rule 1Ob-5 to avoid the controversy over who can "make" statements,
or the Supreme Court may grant certiorariover another case shedding
further light on who has "ultimate authority." Just as in The Office,
having two authorities and no clear understanding of their duties is not a
viable arrangement.2 05 The court proclaimed that only the person or
entity with "ultimate authority" can be held primarily liable. 2 06 Now we
just need to know who has ultimate authority; a question that will be
decided in time through the arguments of lawyers and analysis of
judges.
BRYAN

P.

KING

200. Pecht, supra note 10.
201. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
202. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011), with 15 USC § 78j(a)-(b) (2006).
203. CompareIn re Merck & Co. Inc., 2011 WL 3444199, with Haw. Ironworkers, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98760.
204. See SEC v. Kelly, No. 08 Civ. 4612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108805 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2011).
205. The Office: The Manager and the Salesman (NBC television broadcast Feb. 11,
2010) (summary available at http://www.tv.com/shows/the-office/the-manager-and-thesalesman-1321716/) (the new CEO insists that one of the two managers step down claiming
that "each of you is doing half a job").
206. Janus CapitalGrp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.

